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1ABSTRACT
This paper studies the output effects, transition costs and the change in
pension benefits derived from the substitution of the current unfunded pension
system by a fully funded pension system financed through mandatory savings.
These effects are estimated by using reduced versions of the neoclassical and
endogenous growth frameworks. Because of the greater capital accumulation
during the transition phase, final output increases by 23,6% (neoclassical
framework); and a 24,5-31,5% (endogenous growth framework). The initial
revenue loss for the government would represent a 4,8% of the GDP, raising very
slowly during the transition period. Given the new growth rates, rates of return of
physical capital, and financial intermediation costs, we have that the
capitalization pension benefits obtained by all 30-contribution-year worker would
be more than twice than those that guarantee the financial sustainability of the
public pension system.
RESUMEN
Este artículo estudia los efectos sobre la producción, los costes de la
transición y el cambio en las pensiones que se derivan de una substitución del
actual sistema público de pensiones por otro alternativo de capitalización,
financiado mediante ahorro obligatorio. Estos efectos se estiman utilizando
versiones reducidas de los modelos de crecimiento neoclásico y endógeno.
Debido a la mayor acumulación de capital durante la fase de transición, la
producción final crece un 23,6% (modelo neoclásico); y entre un 24,5-31,5%
(modelo de crecimiento endógeno). La pérdida de ingresos para el estado en el
primer año equivaldría a un 4,8% del PIB, creciendo muy lentamente durante el
período de transición. Dadas las nuevas tasas de crecimiento económico, las tasas
de rentabilidad del capital físico y los costes financieros de intermediación, se
obtiene que las pensiones de capitalización que alcanzaría todo trabajador con 30
años de cotizaciones serían más del doble que las que se pagarían en el sistema
público de pensiones una vez garantizado su viabilidad financiera.
Keywords: Capitalization pensions, capital and output effects, transition costs.
J.E.L. classification: H55, O47.
11. Introduction.
The reform of the Social Security system has become one of the main
issues of the public debate in many countries. Under the current pay-as-you-go,
unfunded system, old workers' pensions are financed through the contributions of
active workers. Because of demographic tendencies, such as the continuous
increase in life expectancy and the reduction in the birth rate, the financing of
future pensions under the current system is not viable, except if a drastic reform
consisting basically of a reduction of future pension benefits is not adopted soon
(see World Bank (1994) for the OECD countries; and Barea et al. (1995), Herce
and Pérez-Díaz (1995), Monasterio et al. (1996) and Piñera and Weinstein (1996)
for Spain).
Recent studies (Arrau (1990); Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993); Feldstein
(1995); Huang, Imrohoroglu and Sargent (1995), Kotlikoff (1995)) have shown
the existence of very major welfare and output gains in the US economy derived
from the transition to a fully funded pension system1. These gains are
fundamentally derived from the difference between the real rate of return of
capital assets and the implicit return of a mature unfunded pensions system, given
the rate of growth of total wage income. Whereas the before-tax real rate of return
of capital assets has been around 7 percent in the American economy in the last
60 years, the average rate of growth of real wages has been less than 3 percent in
the same period. Moreover, the persistent change in demographic tendencies
-increases in life expectancy, reduction in the birth rate- has lowered the real rate
                                                
    1 For instance, Kotlikoff (1995) finds that a transition beetwen the two pension systems
financed through different combinations of tax increases would rise the steady state U.S. output
until a 17%.
2of return of pension contribution to negative levels in the US in recent years (see
Feldstein (1995)).
This paper studies the effects on the level of GDP of a progressive change
in Spain from the current Social Security system to an alternative privatized, fully
funded system financed through mandatory savings. In addition, we analyze the
viability of the reform, that is, we compute the cost for the government of the
transition between the two pension systems. Finally, we compute the pension
benefits derived from the implementation of the fully funded system and we
compare them with the benefits derived from the current unfunded system under
several measures close to the Pacto de Toledo reforms, that guarantee the
financial sustainability of the pension system.
Under the pension reform designed in this paper, all workers who initially
are less than 40 years old would place the proportion of their contributions to the
current Social Security system allocated to the payment of their pensions in
privately managed pension schemes, whereas older workers would continue in
the old unfunded public system. During the transition phase between the two
pension systems, the reform generates a public Social Security system deficit
because of the loss of the contributions of the young workers. After a 25-30 years
period in which the new capitalized pension system progressively replaces the old
pay-as-you-go system, all workers would be in the private pension system. As
usual in this pension scheme, future workers' pensions are financed by the returns
of cumulative savings.
Different versions of the capitalized pension system have been already
implemented in several countries. On one hand, some twenty countries, mostly
former British colonies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific islands have mandatory,
publicly managed pension plans. These countries had no public pay-as-you-go
pension system when they established their national funded plan. On the other
3hand, Chile, which is the only country whose capitalized pension system is
privately and competitively managed (see World Bank [1994])2. A common
characteristic of these countries is the high savings rate generated by the
capitalization system, which has been a key factor in explaining their relatively
very high growth rates. In Singapore, workers capitalize, since July 1994, a 40%
percent of their wages (20% each by the employer and the employee) in the
publicly managed Central Provident Fund, established in 19553. Since then, the
gross domestic savings rate has been increased from 10 percent in 1955 to 39
percent in 19934. At the same time the growth rate, which oscillated around an
average of 2 percent per year in the 50s, increased to an average of more than 8
percent in the last thirty years. This rate of growth means that the Singaporean
GDP requires less than nine years to double.
Closer to the pension reform designed in this work is the Chilean reform5.
In Chile, the new capitalization system was introduced in 1981. Under the
Chilean system, all covered workers must place a 10 percent of their monthly
earnings in privately managed savings accounts. The success of the Chilean
reform is almost unanimously recognized: pension plans have yielded an average
                                                
    2 Hong-Kong has adopted a privately managed, mandatory fully funded scheme in July 1995,
and is in process of drafting the subsidiary legislations to be enacted in early 1997.
    3 Singapore has the highest contribution rates in the world because the Central Provident Fund
system permits accumulated assets to be used for other purposes as housing (during the 1980s,
2/3 of fund withdrawals were used for housing purchases), education or health care (see, Asher
(1996) for a description of the Singaporean Central Provident Fund).
    4 According to Asher (1996), high contribution rates and rising wages have meant that the
Central Provident Fund system has been an important contributor to Singapore's high savings. In
1991 the contribution to saving ranged from 16,3% of Gross National Saving (7,8% of GDP) to
30,4% of GNS (14,6% of GDP). In 1991 GNS was equal to 47,9% of GDP.
    5 For a more detailed analysis of the Chilean experience, see Diamond (1993) and Diamond
and Valdes-Prieto (1994).
4real rate of return of 12% during the last 15 years (Piñera and Weinstein [1995]),
which implied that a great volume of funds were invested in the Chilean
economy6.
Moreover, as in Singapore, the reform has substantially increased the
savings rate from 14 percent of the GDP in 1981 to 27 percent in 1995. As a
consequence, the Chilean economy, which grew at a lower rate than the average
of the Latin American countries until 1980, grew at a substantially
greater-than-average rate of 7% per year during the last decade, making Chile -
after Argentina- the country with a greater per capita GDP (measured in
purchasing power parity) of all Latin American countries. This level was in 1993
comparable with that of Greece (World Development Report, 1995)7.
We design a change in the pension system which verifies three properties.
First, no worker (retired or active) must suffer a pension benefit loss during the
transition period or in the steady state of the new capitalization system. Second,
workers' contribution costs must be the same under the two alternative systems. In
fact, throughout our analysis we impose the condition that the wage percentage
contribution to the fully funded system must equal the actual burden of the
contributions to the pay-as-you-go system. Third, the transition costs generated
by the financing of public pensions must be "bearable" for the government. This
condition imposes a lower limit on the transition period between the two pension
                                                
6 Other remarkable merits of the Chilean pension system is the development of capital
markets and the insulation of pension benefits from political risk (Diamond (1993)). Holzman
(1996) points out that capital funds through the devolopment of capital markets have contributed
to the growth rate of the Chilean economy between 0,9 and 2,1 percentage points. However, a
major problem are the high intermediation costs because of the existence of many individual
retirement accounts.
    7 Argentina, Colombia, and Perú have very recently adopted private, mandatory savings
pension plans, following the case of Chile. Some Eastern European countries are considering
similar schemes.
5systems, because a very short transition period raises the public pensions
financing burden8.
The success of the proposed pension system reform depends crucially on
the way in which the public pensions deficit is financed during the transition
between the two pension systems. If the government chooses to finance the
pension system through a reduction in public consumption, we find that the net
savings effect of the transition is maximized, and so capital accumulation and
output growth. The faster economy's growth reduces the burden of public
pensions in the long run and raises the overall benefits of the new pension system.
However, if the government finances pensions through proportional public deficit
increases, the output and physical capital gains are substantially smaller, but -
even in this case- there exists the possibility of such gains under realistic
assumptions (see Feldstein (1995)). These gains are derived from the fact that the
rate of return of the current unfunded system -and thus the service of the debt to
be paid by the government- is much smaller than the average rate of return of
physical capital9. A third option is to finance public pensions through either tax
increases or transfers reductions. In this case, the net effect of the pension system
change depends on the effect of these measures on private, voluntary savings.
To compute the capital and output accumulation effects of the transition to
a fully funded pension system, we use two alternative frameworks: neoclassical
and endogenous growth models. This approach allows a greater consistency of
our results, which are largely independent on the macroeconomic framework
used. In the neoclassical framework (Solow (1956)), technical progress is neutral
                                                
    8 For instance, the cost of immediately shifting all workers to the privatized system would
represent a 9,3% of the GDP.
    9 For the U.S. economy, the historical long run real rate of return of public debt has been of
0,5%, whereas before-tax rate of return of capital has been around 7%.
6and exogenously given, there is perfect competition and the output technology
presents constant to scale returns. In the alternative endogenous growth model
(Romer (1986)), technological change increases with physical capital investment,
and the assumptions of perfect competition and constant to scale returns do not
necessarily hold.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. If we consider that the
economy follows closely the neoclassical growth framework, we have that the
pension reform would raise GDP by 23,6% in 2025. Alternatively, if we consider
the endogenous growth as a more accurate description of the reality, the GDP
growth is 31,5% in the case in which there is no significant substitution between
mandatory, pension funds savings and the rest of savings. If we assume partial
substitution of 20% between the two kinds of savings, the GDP growth is 24,5%,
and when it is assumed a high partial substitution of 60% between contributions
to the fully funded pension system and other forms of saving, the GDP growth is
reduced to 11%. To obtain these results, we compare the projected evolution of
the Spanish economy -assuming that GDP will grow at an average rate of 3%-
with that obtained with the higher savings rate generated by the transition
between the two pension systems.
We also obtain that the initial transition costs for the government of the
pension reform here proposed are equivalent to 4,8% of the GDP. This cost is
high, and implies a strong fiscal adjustment. However, empirical evidence (see
Alesina and Perotti (1995)) shows several recent similar fiscal adjustments in
democratic Western countries. For instance, in Belgium public deficit fell by 4%
of the GDP in only one year, 1987. In Ireland, a quantitatively similar adjustment
based almost exclusively on reductions of public expenditures was carried out in
1987-1989. Very recently, the American Congress has approved spending cuts
7which are substantially stronger than those here proposed (but the cuts will be
carried out over the next seven years).
 Finally, from the income redistribution perspective, it is obtained that all
groups belonging to the "Régimen General" category are substantially benefited
by the new pension system. The gains are really huge (2,9-3,2 times the pay-as-
you-go pension under a harder version of the Pacto de Toledo reform) if we
assume that the economy follows the endogenous growth framework -with a 3%
capitalization rate. But even in the case in which the economy behaves as in the
neoclassical model, we have that the median 30-contribution-year worker would
receive a pension which is more than 2,3 times the same obtained under the
public pension system. Workers' gains are enhanced by the fact that a greater
output growth increases workers' wages and thus the contributions to the fully
funded pension system.
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
the historical evolution of the Spanish public pension system and its perspectives.
Section III finds the physical capital and output effects of the reform under a
neoclassical growth framework; whereas Section IV obtains these effects under a
simplified version of an endogenous growth model. Section V studies the initial
cost and the evolution of the public pension system deficit generated by the
transition to a fully funded pension system. Section VI calculates the pension
benefits obtained under the new private pension system by every group of
workers, and compares them with the pension benefits derived from the proposed
Pacto de Toledo reforms. The Conclusion resumes the main results and considers
the possibility of extensions of our approach.
2. Social Security in Spain: Historical Overview, Perspectives and Projected
Reforms of the Public Pension System.
8As in other European countries, the first institutions of the Spanish social
welfare system were established at the beginning of this century. Since then, we
can distinguish two clearly differentiated phases. During the first one (which
finishes in 1963), the government creates several social security institutions
which act separately. The most important of these institutions is the SOVI
(Seguro Obligatorio de Vejez e Invalidez), which was a sort of an embryonic
pay-as-you-go pension system.
The second stage starts in 1963 with the Ley de Bases. This law unified the
different social protection institutions into a single pay-as-you-go Social Security
system. Since the implementation of the new system, "contributive" pension
expenditures have grown at an astonishing average real rate of 10% per year, and
its weight has changed from 0,92% of the GDP in 1963 to 9,46% in 1996. In the
same period the contribution resources obtained by the Social Security have
grown at a much lower average real rate of 6%, increasing its GDP weight from
4,57% in 1963 to 10% in 1996. As a consequence of the greater expenditures'
growth, the State transfer to the Social Security system has grown from nearly
zero to a level of 4,9% of the GDP in 1996. State resources have been basically
oriented to the financing of the Social Security health system.
The outstanding growth of public pensions expenditures has induced the
government to adopt some measures oriented to the deceleration of pension
expenditures. The most important of them is the Ley de Medidas Urgentes para la
Racionalización de la Estructura y de la Acción Protectora de la Seguridad
Social, promulgated in 1985. This law has raised the minimum contribution
period required to receive a contributive pension from 10 to 15 years, from which
two of them must be (at least) in the eight year period before the beginning of the
pension payment. Other measures intended to curb the increase in pension
9expenditures -such as the rise of the minimum contribution period used to
calculate the pension perceived- has been also implemented.
The 1985 law main achievement was a transitory, four year reduction of
the percentage of public expenditure devoted to pension payments. After this
period, the underlying negative demographic forces lead to a new increase in
public pension expenditures. This increase has motivated a recent agreement
between the government, political parties and social groups (Pacto de Toledo
reform, October 1996) oriented to guarantee the viability of the public pension
system. Since the burden of Social security contributions in Spain is already very
high -around 25% of total labor costs-, the adoption of measures is basically
intended to curb future pension expenditures increases.
However, to achieve this objective, the government must consider that,
because of the projected rise in the number of pensioners, over 50% in the next 30
years (Herce and Pérez-Díaz (1995), Piñera and Weinstein (1996)), and the much
slower growth of the occupied workers, between 0,5% and 0,7% per year (Carpio
and Domingo (1996), Piñera and Weinstein (1996), the financial equilibrium
between contributions and pension expenditures would be only achieved through
a 30-40% reduction in real future pensions. In the long run, this reduction does
not depend on the rate of growth of the productivity of workers. Effectively, a
higher productivity growth implies greater Social Security revenues, but also
higher pensions because pension benefits are calculated as an average of the
wages perceived in the last period of the working life.
In a previous work, Gil (1997), was pointed out that the Pacto de Toledo
reform, such as it was designed in October 1996, would be inadequate to
accomplish the future financial liabilities of the Spanish Social Security system.
Therefore, as long as we want to compare private pensions versus public
pensions, we need to take into account other types of measures oriented to reform
10
the public pension system in a more deep way. In particular, the main proposals
analyzed in this work can be resumed as:
a) A gradual enlargement of the contribution period considered for the calculation
of new pensions, from the average real wage of the last 8 years to the average real
wage entire contribution period. This means an important reduction in the
pension received by future retired workers, because real wages of very past
periods (which are, on average, much lower than present wages) will weight the
same as recent wages.
b) A progressive reduction in the percentage of discounted wages received as a
pension by retired workers. Currently, a 15-year-contribution worker receives
60% of the average real wage corresponding to her last eight contribution years.
Under this proposal, the percentage received is CYi/35, where CYi are the
contribution years of the worker i. This means that (for instance) a 15-year-
contribution worker will receive only 15/35 = 42,8% of the calculated base,
which is given by the average real wage of the last 15 years (which is lower than
the average wage of the last 8 years). A limit on the effectiveness of this measure
to curb pension spending is that, actually, in the Régimen General, 75% of
workers contribute more than 35 years.
c) A gradual increase in the retirement age to 68 or 70 years. This measure is
intended to raise the effective contribution period and to reduce the pension
benefit period.
The overall effect of the these proposed reforms is a substantial reduction
in pension benefits. Gil (1997) shows that pension cuts -which oscillate between
22% and 44%- are general and significant, and they would be able to guarantee
the financial equilibrium of the public pension system in the long run.
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Next Section starts the study of an alternative reform aimed to guarantee
the future payment of reasonable pension benefits: the change to a fully funded
pension system.
3. Output Effects of the Privatization of Pensions: the Neoclassical
Framework.
3.1 The Theoretical Framework.
This Section estimates the physical capital and output effects of the
pension system transition by using a modified version of the Solow's model,
Solow (1956), in which we include labor measured in efficiency terms. This
approach is similar to that used by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
We depart from a closed economy in which markets are perfectly
competitive and firms maximize profits. The assumption of closed economy
means that the interest rate of capital is not fixed and varies with the
output-capital ratio10. The perfect competition assumption (in a Cobb-Douglas
production function framework) implies the equality between the technical
coefficients of the output production function and the income participation of
different productive factors. Technological progress is assumed to be neutral and
exogenously given. As usual, technological progress will be proxied by Total
                                                
10 Certainly, the hyphotesis of a closed economy is quite restrictive. But, for instance, is also
used by Auerbach et al. (1989) when they study the interactions between demographic
tendencies and social security policies for a set of developed countries. On the other hand, we
have extensive evidence on international capital inmobility, including the lack of international.
portfolio diversification, real interest differentials across countries or the high correlation
between domestic savings and investment; again suggesting important barriers to capital
mobility. In particluar, Argimón and Roldán (1994) finds emprical support for a low
international capital mobility during the period 1960-1988 in Spain, because of effective capital
controls.
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Factor Productivity (TFP), which measures the growth of output unexplained by
capital or labor increases.
Even if the ideal theoretical framework to study Social Security issues is an
overlapping generations model (as in Arrau (1990), Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel
(1993), Feldstein (1995), Huang et al. (1995) and Kotlikoff (1995)), under which
savings is endogenously determined, there exists empirical evidence (see, for
instance, Hubbard (1984), Feenberg and Skinner (1989) and Venti and Wise
(1990)) that shows that there is little or not substitution of savings derived from
the introduction of pension plans. For this reason, we compute the model under
this assumption, and we focus in the effects of the transition between the two
pension systems under different technological assumptions.
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3.1.1 Savings Behavior Under the Transition
The key variable in the model is the evolution of the savings rate during
the transition phase to the new system. The economy's savings rate st is given by
the sum of both private and public voluntary savings, sv, and net mandatory
savings, sm. Net mandatory savings are given by the sum of the contributions to
the capitalization system minus the capitalized pensions payments. But in the first
stage of the transition between the two pension systems, nearly all contributions
to the capitalized pension system (made by young workers) are net savings. This
happens because there are almost no pension payments. Once the first cohort of
young workers retire, the rate of net mandatory savings declines and, in the long
run, eventually becomes zero. However, since mandatory savings are positive
during the transition phase, capital and output (but not growth) will be greater in
the long run under the fully funded system if the rate of total net savings -
voluntary plus mandatory savings- effectively augments.
Voluntary savings can be affected by the capitalization of pensions through
two ways. First, the private consumption-savings behavior of agents can be
modified as a consequence of the introduction of the new pension system.
Second, the way chosen by the government to finance the public pension deficit
can modify the output effects of the pension system change because it can offset
the positive savings effect of the transition between the two pension systems.
Since the decisions on the amount of individuals' resources allocated to
pension plans are not taken by individuals but rather by the government, and
since the reform proposed here assumes that the same fraction of wages is
destined to the privatized system (as it is now), the only effect on individuals'
savings decisions of the pension reform derives from the greater expected future
pension under the fully funded system.
14
There are two effects of a greater expected pension. On one hand, the
higher pension benefits has a negative income effect on voluntary savings11. On
the other hand, since the risk inherent to a private pension system is higher than
the risk associated to the alternative public system, if individuals are sufficiently
risk-averse, they can decide to save more. The combined effect of an expected
greater future pension and higher uncertainty can be either an increase or decrease
in the rate of voluntary savings. Moreover, even in the case in which the total
voluntary savings effect of the transition to a new pension system is negative, the
existence of liquidity constraints in real economies that limit individuals' capacity
to get indebted reduces the negative impact of the new pension system.
However, despite these theoretical arguments, we firstly start our analysis
by assuming that the total individuals' voluntary savings rate effect of the
implementation of a mandatory, fully funded pension system is zero. Secondly,
next Section 4 -which considers a perhaps more sophisticated and realistic model-
introduces the alternative assumption of a negative effect of mandatory savings
on voluntary savings, and evaluates capital and output dynamics under this
assumption.
On one hand, according to, for instance, Hubbard (1984), Feenberg and
Skinner (1989) and Venti and Wise (1990), in which contributions to retirement
accounts -such as IRAs, Keoghs and 401Ks-  represent substantial net saving
                                                
11  It is important to remark that we are refering to a mandatory pension scheme, so tax
aspects of the program are leaved apart. When private pensions are tax favoured, there appears
to be in optional savings plans the traditional ambiguity -for the marginal saver- between a
substitution effect, which means less current consumption (because of the defered tax
payments); and an income effect, which leads to a higher current and future consumption. For
the intramarginal saver (whose savings is above the deductible limit) the favourable tax
treatment on savings only causes an income effect.
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increases12, we will assume a little effect of 20% substitution of voluntary savings
by mandatory savings. On the other hand, following other papers, for instance,
Pesando (1991), Munnell and Yohn (1992) and Gale and Scholz (1994), in which
contributions to private pension schemes have only a modest positive impact on
total individual net saving, we will suppose that the crowd-out effect is as high as
60%.
There is a second way in which the rate of savings can be affected during
the transition, which is the way chosen by the government to finance the public
pensions deficit generated by the change between the two pension systems. The
government can finance this deficit through three kinds of measures, or a
combination of them: a reduction of public consumption, an increase in taxes or a
reduction in transfers, and an increase in public deficit or a reduction of public
investment. If the government chooses to finance the public pensions deficit
through a proportional reduction in public consumption, there is no negative
effect on aggregate savings. In this case, the capital accumulation and output
growth effects of the transition are maximized. If the government raises taxes or
reduces transfers, in general there is a negative effect on voluntary savings which
depends on which tax or which type of transfer is chosen by the government.
Finally, if the government runs an additional national debt of equal value to the
public pension deficit, the increase in saving and output growth is reduced due to
the payment of the debt service, and the transition costs will be substantially
greater in the long run.
For our estimation purposes, we consider the case in which the government
adopts the behavior which maximizes the capital and output effects, and finances
                                                
12  Lopéz García (1996), through a general equilibrium analysis framework, also shows that
the tax favoured private pension plans are susceptible to cause higher levels of savings and
capital accumulation.
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the transition's pension deficit through a proportional reduction in public
consumption expenditures. It is possible, of course, to assume that the pension
system deficit is financed through other measures, such as a tax increase, but the
computation of the economy's dynamics becomes more troublesome because we
need to compute the negative induced savings effects of the tax increase. We thus
estimate the capital and output effects of the pension system change in the
neoclassical economy under the assumption that the savings rate is given by st =
sv + sm.
It is important to remark that the economy's savings rate is only increased
during the transition between the two systems (which lasts between 30 and 50
years, approximately). Thus, output only grows at a higher rate during the
transition period, in which capital accumulation is faster because of the greater
savings rate. The steady-state ratio between physical capital and output, equal to
K/Y = s/(d + g), does not change13, because this ratio is only affected by the long
run rate of savings, s, (which we assume that is the same under the two pension
systems) as well as by the exogenous rate of depreciation of physical capital, d,
and the exogenously given rate of technological change, g.
                                                
    13 This does not mean that the levels of both physical capital and output are also the same,
because the transition raises the level of these two variables.
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3.1.2 The Dynamics
The dynamics of the physical capital stock is given by the equation
K K s Yt t t t= - +-( )1 1d  (1)
where d is the physical capital depreciation rate, st is the savings rate and Yt
represents final output. Output is produced according to the constant-to-scale
returns production function
Y A K Ht t t t= - -1 1a a (2)
where Ht is a measure of human capital. Using the perfect competition
assumption, a equals the participation of physical capital income with respect to
total income. The Spanish national accounting suggests a = 0,5, and this value is
used by some economists in their estimations. However, many other economists
consider this value to high, because the accounting of capital income includes a
part of autonomous workers' labor income. They take a = 0,4. We will take the
most conservative approach in our estimation, that is, a = 0,4 (and hence 1- a =
0,6).
On the other hand, technical progress At evolves over time following the
dynamic equation
A A gt t A= +- 1 1( ) (3)
where gA is the exogenously given rate of growth of technological progress.
3.2 Estimation Results.
In order to analyze the introduction of a fully funded pension system, we
simulate the economy, by using the dynamic equations (1)-(3), under two
18
different scenarios: first, a benchmark economy without any change in the Social
Security system and second, an economy with a capitalized pension system, as it
was designed above.
We depart from the benchmark economy in which output and physical
capital grows at the same constant rate, 3% per year. This means that the
capital-output ratio remains constant over time in the benchmark economy, and so
the interest rate. The savings rate compatible with the capital and output growth,
and the depreciation rate, is equal to 21%.
The MOISEES database provides historical data about real GDP Yt, the
capital stock Kt, the number of occupied workers Lt, and the depreciation rate of
the capital stock, d14. We consider the depreciation rate d = 0,062 as a central
value derived from the MOISEES database. We compute the amount of labor in
efficiency units, Ht, the growth rate of technical progress gA, and the net
mandatory savings rate generated in the transition between the two pension
systems.
To estimate human capital -or labor in efficiency units- we consider that
the relative efficiency of different types of labor is measured by the difference in
relative wages. For instance, if a worker with only primary education earns a
gross wage of 2 million ptas. per year, and a worker with higher education earns 5
million ptas., this means that the higher education worker is 2,5 more productive
than the primary education worker. Using this formalization and the data
provided by the Active Population Survey and the Wage Survey (Instituto
Nacional de Estadística), we to obtain the evolution of the structure of the
working population measured by their educational achievement and the relative
wages. Table I shows the data.
                                                
14  See, Series Macoeconómicas Asociadas al MOISEES, Banco de España y Secretaría de
Estado de Hacienda.
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We obtain that, in the period 1963-1984, human capital grew at an average
rate of 1,1 percent per year. In the period 1985-1994, the growth rate was 2,3
percent per year. This faster growth reflects the outstanding increase in higher
education enrollment rates since the recession years. We take an intermediate
value, 1,86 percent, as the projected average growth rate for human capital
between 1996 and 2025.
The growth rate of technological progress, gA, is immediately derived from
our assumptions about the evolution of output, physical and human capital.
Effectively, given the technology represented by equation (2) and a = 0,4; the rate
of growth of TFP is gA = gY - 0,4 gK - 0,6 gH. Using our projections, we obtain gA
@ 0,7%.
To estimate the alternative evolution of the economy under the transition
between the two pension systems, we depart from the same initial values for
physical capital Kt, GDP (Yt), and technical progress, (At). The new savings rate
is given by 0,21 + sm, where sm is the mandatory savings rate generated by the
pension reform. Using the previous values for all parameters, we have that the
dynamics of the economy is given by the equations
[ ]K K s A K Ht t m t t t= - + +-( , ) ( , ) ( , ), ,1 0 062 0 21 1 01861 0 4 0 0 60  (4)
and
A At t= +- 1 1 0 007( , ) (5)
Table II and III shows the results. Table II shows the actual evolution of savings,
physical capital and output; assuming a GDP growth of 3%, whereas Table III
shows the alternative evolution under the transition to a privatized pension
system.
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We can appreciate that, as a consequence of the greater savings rate
generated during the transition between the two pension systems, physical capital
increases a 68,7%, and output rises a 23,6% with respect to the actual evolution
under the current public pension system. These figures imply that the average
growth rate of physical capital changes from 3% (in the benchmark economy) to
4,7%, and that the average growth rate of the GDP rises from 3% to 3,7% in the
period 1996-2025.
4. Output Effects of the Privatization of Pensions: the Endogenous Growth
Framework.
The framework used in the previous Section has been widely criticized
because of the lack of realism of their assumptions. Moreover, some empirical
work, Boskin and Lau (1992), has rejected all the main hypothesis underlying the
neoclassical framework: exogenous technological change, perfect competition,
and constant to scale returns production function.      
For this reason, with the objective of increasing the realism of our results,
we alternatively estimate the effect of the privatization of pensions on aggregate
savings, capital accumulation and output growth, by using a simplified version of
the Romer's model (Romer (1986)). In this model, physical capital investment
generates a public capital good which increases the productivity of the economy.
However, in a similar way than under the neoclassical framework, in his paper
Romer maintained the assumptions of perfect competition and constant to scale
returns in privately appropriable inputs which, according to Boskin and Lau
(1992), have been rejected by the empirical evidence. We relax these assumptions
and, in addition, we introduce the different performance for investment and final
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output goods prices that has been observed in almost every economy15, so we are
implicitly considering a two-sector model in which capital and final goods are
produced through different technologies.
We depart from the national accounting identity between gross investment
and savings
[ ]P K K
P Y
sK t t
Y t
t
t
t
- -
=-
( )1 1d (6)
where Kt, Kt-1 are the stocks of physical capital at t and t-1 respectively, d is the
depreciation rate of physical capital, Yt is the gross domestic product, PKt and PYt
are the  physical capital investment and GDP deflactors respectively, and st is the
economy's savings rate.
We consider different prices for capital goods and final output because the
Spanish data for the period 1963-1995 show a different behavior for the two
prices. In particular, the GDP deflactor grew by 0,8 percent per year more than
the investment one. The implication of this empirical result is that cost reduction
(and thus technological progress) is faster in the sector which produces capital
goods than in the final output sector.
                                                
    15 Gordon (1990) shows that, on average, the relative price of equipement has fallen at a rate
of more than 3% per year in the U.S.
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4.1 The Production Function
 We assume that output Yt is generated through an aggregate production
function that can be written in the form
Y F A K Ht t t t= -( , )1 (7)
where At is technical progress and Ht is human capital, or labor measured in
efficiency terms.
The above specification of the production function means the existence of
capital-augmenting technical progress. This is consistent with empirical evidence
from a sample of OECD countries, as Boskin and Lau (1992) show. These
authors estimate an aggregate meta-production function without the conventional
and restrictive assumptions of neutrality of technical progress, constant-to-scale
returns, and profit maximization with competitive output and factors markets,
implicit in the standard neoclassical Cobb-Douglas production function (Yt = At
F[Kt-1, Ht] = At Kt-1a Ht1-a). They obtain that technical progress is strongly
complementary of capital formation, that technological progress can be
represented by a single set of augmentation rates for capital, and that the
elasticities of output with respect to physical capital and labor are a Î  [0,21;
0,29] and b Î  [0,5; 0,55] respectively. Following their empirical findings, we
assume that the aggregate production function (7) takes the form
Y A K Ht t t t= -( )1 a b (8)
with a = 0,25 and b = 0,5. 
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4.2 The Dynamics.
According to the empirical findings of Boskin and Lau (1992), we consider
that technical progress evolves over time following the linear equation
A A
A
gt t
t
K t
- =-
-
1
1
g (9)
where g is a parameter that measures the influence of the growth rate of the
physical capital stock, gKt, on technological innovation. The value of g will be
estimated through ordinary least squares.
Using the production function (8) and the equality between investment and
savings given by (6), we have that the stock of physical capital follows the 
dynamic equation
K K
s
P
A K Ht t
t
t
t t t= - +- -( ) ( )*1 1 1d
a b (10)
where Pt* = PKt / PYt is the ratio between the prices of capital goods and final
output. The economy's dynamics is given by equations (9)-(10).
The dynamics generated by the two dynamic equations (9) and (10) is
studied in Appendix I. This Appendix shows that the model presented here
converges to a balanced growth path in which PKt (Kt - (1-d)Kt-1) / PYt Yt is
constant over time. The ratio Kt / Ht does not remain constant in the balanced
growth path however, but this does not represent any problem for the model
dynamics because human capital is labor measured in efficiency units in this
model. In particular, given the parameter values here considered, it is obtained
that physical capital grows at a higher rate than labor in efficiency units in the
balanced growth path. This result is consistent with empirical evidence.
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4.3 Estimation Results: No Substitution between Voluntary and Mandatory
Savings.
As it was explained above, we take the empirically verified values of a =
0,25 and b =0,5. As in the Section 3, we consider the depreciation rate d = 0,062
as a central value derived from the MOISEES database, and gH = 1,86% per year
as the estimated growth rate of human capital. The MOISEES database shows
that the relative capital-output prices PKt / PYt decreased, on average, by 0,8% per
year during the period 1963-1995. It is assumed that the decrease will be the same
in the period 1996-2025 as it was during the period 1963-1995.
Equation (9): gA = h + g gK + e, where ,e @ i.i.d (0, s2) is estimated by the
OLS estimation method. To do this, we differentiate logarithmically in the
production function (8) and we substitute the dynamic equation for technical
progress (9). We obtain
[ ]g g a g a bgY H K K- = + + º +b a g( )1 (11)
where b = a (1+g). Table IV shows the estimation results. We can appreciate in
this Table that a is not significant, so we neglect this parameter for the rest of our
estimations. From a (1+g) = 0,544, we obtain g = 1,176.
The previous results (a no significant, g greater than one) mean that, as in
Boskin and Lau (1992), exogenous technical progress is almost irrelevant, and
that an increase in the growth rate of physical capital raises the rate of
technological progress more than proportionally. These results are consistent with
a production function which exhibits increasing returns once we have considered
the effect of capital increase on technological change (as in Romer (1986)).
As in the previous Section, the benchmark economy grows at a 3% per
year. We consider that the benchmark economy is in a balanced growth path, that
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is, Kt / Yt does not change in the period considered. The reader can easily check
that both the savings rate s = 21% and the human capital growth rate gH = 1,86%
are consistent with the steady state of this model. Using the  previous values for
all parameters, we have that the dynamics of the economy follows the equations
[ ] [ ]K K sP A K Ht t mt t t t t
t= - + +- -( , )
,
( , )
( , )
*
, ,1 0 062
0 21
0 992
1 01861 1
0 25 0 5
0
0
(12)
and
A A gt t K t= +- 1 1 1176( , ) (13)
Table II and V shows the results. Table II shows the actual evolution of savings,
physical capital and output; assuming a GDP growth of 3%, whereas Table V
shows the alternative evolution under the transition to a privatized  pension
system.
We can appreciate that, as a consequence of the greater savings rate
generated during the transition between the two pension systems, physical capital
increases a 61,6%, and output rises a 31,5% with respect to the actual evolution
under the current public pension system. These figures imply that the average
growth rate of physical capital changes from 3,8% (in the benchmark economy)
to 5,6%, and that the average growth rate of the GDP rises from 3% to 3,9% in
the period 1996-2025.
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4.4 Estimation Results: Partial Substitution between Voluntary and
Mandatory Savings.
We relax the assumption of non substitution between voluntary and
mandatory savings to consider that the implementation of a private pension
scheme has a final negative effect on voluntary savings. On one hand, since some
empirical studies (see, again, Hubbard (1984), Feenberg and Skinner (1989) and
Venti and Wise (1990)) show a negligible substitution effect of private pension
plans, we compute the dynamics of the model under the assumption that one
percent of pension plan savings substitute 0,2 percent of voluntary savings, that
is, we estimate
[ ] [ ]K K s sP A K Ht t m mt t t t t
t= - + - +- -( , )
( , , )
( , )
( , )
*
, ,1 0 062
0 21 0 2
0 992
1 01861 1
0 25 0 5
0
0
(14)
jointly with the dynamic equation (13).
On the other hand, according to other papers (see, for instance, Pesando
(1991), Munnell and Yohn (1992) and Gale and Scholz (1994)) that show a high
substitution effect of private retirement plans, it is also computed the dynamics of
the model assuming that one percent of pension plan contributions substitute 0,6
percent of voluntary savings, that is, we estimate
[ ] [ ]K K s sP A K Ht t m mt t t t t
t= - + - +- -( , )
( , , )
( , )
( , )
*
, ,1 0 062
0 21 0 6
0 992
1 01861 1
0 25 0 5
0
0
(15)
jointly with the dynamic equation (13).
Table VI shows the evolution of savings, physical capital and output under
the transition to a fully funded pension system with savings substitution of 20%.
Comparing with the predicted of these variables (see Table II) we have that,
under a 20% substitution parameter of voluntary by mandatory savings, physical
capital increases under the transition between the two systems by 46,3% with
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respect to the benchmark economy; whereas output grows by a 24,5%. While
Table VII shows the evolution of savings, physical capital and output with
savings substitution of 60%. Again comparing with the predicted of these
variables (see Table II) we have that, under a 60% substitution parameter of
voluntary by mandatory savings, physical capital increases under the transition
between the two systems by 18,3% with respect to the benchmark economy;
whereas output grows by a 11%.
5. Transition Costs.
Once the capital and output effects of the pension system change has been
computed under alternative approaches, an interesting exercise is the study of the
cost for the government of the transition designed. These costs are derived from
the deficit in the public pension system imposed by the loss of the contributions
of younger workers, and by the condition that no individual who receives (or will
receive) a public pension must be harmed by the pension change.
The estimation of the government transition costs is thus done as follows.
The total amount of pension expenditures represents a 9,3% of the GDP. Using
the data about the age composition of Social Security affiliated workers16 and
workers' wages (Castillo and Toharia (1991)), we estimate that the proportion of
Social Security contributions made by workers with less than 40 years old will be
52% of overall contributions in 1996. From these figures, we have that the initial
revenues loss for the government is (0,52) (9,3%) = 4,8% of the GDP.
How do the GDP proportion of transition costs evolve over time?. In a
theoretical framework, there are two opposite effects. On one hand, the
proportion of workers in the fully funded system increases over time, as workers'
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generations with less than 40 years in 1996 get older and generations with more
than this age become retired. Thus, the revenue loss for the government becomes
greater, because less people contribute to the old public system. On the other
hand, the faster economic growth implies that the fraction of the GDP which
covers the cost of the already existing public system is lower. Under the reform
designed in this paper, the overall effect of these two effects is negative, and the
GDP proportion destined to the financing of public pension rises from 4,8% to
7,4% in 2025, in the endogenous growth model with partial savings substitution
of 20%; to 8,4% of the GDP in the case of a partial savings substitution of 60%;
to 7% of the GDP in the model without savings substitution; and to 7,5% in the
neoclassical framework.
Hence, the further fiscal adjustment originated by the over time increase in
transition costs (2,2%-3,6% percentage points in 30 years) is not relevant in
comparison with the 4,8% of the GDP initial fiscal adjustment. Moreover, we do
not introduce in our analysis other important side effects of the transition between
the two systems for the public finances. For instance, the greater investment and
GDP growth is able to create a number of 250.000 new jobs equipped with the
same capital as old jobs. This means a long run reduction in unemployment to
nearly zero, and hence a reduction in unemployment subsidies, which nowadays
represent a 3,5% of the GDP. In addition, the larger amount of active workers
raises the tax base and implies greater government revenues even if tax rates are
not increased.
6. A Comparison Of Pension Benefits Under The Two Systems.
                                                                                                                                   
16 Anuario de Estadísticas Laborales. Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1995.
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A decisive variable in the political decision on the implementation of the
new fully funded system must be the pension benefits of workers under the new
system. On the other hand, it is worth to note, as it is shown in Gil (1997), that the
deep Social Security reform needed to guarantee the viability of the public
pension system in the long run would imply an average reduction in pension
benefits of around 30-40%. For this reason, we will compute the public pension
benefits taking into account a harder version of the Pacto de Toledo reform.
To compare with these pensions, we estimate the capitalization pensions
corresponding to the rate of returns and wage increases implicit in our analysis.
For instance, Table VIII shows the average rate of return of physical capital and
the rate of growth of real wages (which is computed through the difference
between the GDP growth rate and the 1% working population growth rate) for the
endogenous growth model with savings substitution of 20% and 60%. It is
assumed that workers contribute during 30 years to the private pension plan, a
24.8% pay-roll tax rate, retirement at 70, life expectancy at 90, a 10% financial
intermediation costs of the yearly contributions17. It is also considered both a 3
and 5% capitalization rate of total wealth in pension funds. Notwithstanding, the
pay-as-you-go pensions are calculated under a harder version of the Pacto de
Toledo reform (see Section 2) and assuming that workers retire at 70, a 2% real
wage growth rate and the last 35 years wage earnings computed in real terms but
the last two in nominal terms.
                                                
    17 In Chile (see Diamnond [1993]) the intermediation costs represented about 30% of the 10%
mandatory savings rate. We consider smaller intermediation costs for Spain because, first, the
greater degree of development of the Spanish financial market and, second, because the
regulation of the Chilean reform implied measures such as the prohibition of collective pension
funds, avoiding the obtention of potencial economies of scale that arise when the amount of
pension funds managed by the financial intermediaries is greater.
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Tables IX-X show the corresponding pension benefits for several groups of
workers in the year 2025. We can appreciate that pension benefits under the fully
funded system, with a real rate of capitalization of 3%, are between 2,3 and 3,2
times the pension obtained under a harder version of the Pacto de Toledo reforms
for all workers' groups, and between 2,7 and 3,8 with a 5% capitalization rate.
Notice also (see Appendix II) that private pensions are calculated assuming that
widows receive a 100% of their consorts' pensions (in contrast with the 45%
received under the public system) and that the same percentage of incapacity
pensions are paid under the new system (25%).
7. Conclusion.
The objective of this Chapter is to show the fallacy of the two main
objections to the introduction of a new privatized pension system, which are: a)
the transition costs between the two systems are so high that the implementation
of the new system is impossible in practice, b) only the richer individuals would
benefit from the fully funded pension system. In contrast, we obtain that the
financing of transition costs requires a fiscal adjustment which is not substantially
greater than other fiscal adjustments experienced by democratic OECD countries.
Moreover, because the future average real rate of return of the current pay-as-
you-go system is quite low (see Chapter I), we show that the returns implicit in
the new private system imply greater pension benefits for all workers than the
public pension system (see also Chapter III).
In addition, this work shows that, whatever the theoretical framework
considered, there are important output gains of the transition between the two
pension systems. This result is not surprising after the work of Huang et al.
[1995] or Kotlikoff [1995], among others. Using an Auerbach-Kotlikoff dynamic
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life-cycle model, Kotlikoff [1995] shows that, depending on the fiscal instruments
adopted by the government, physical capital would be 52% higher and output
17% higher in the US after the transition between the two pension systems.
Furthermore, these authors measure the welfare gains of the pension system
change and they obtain that this gains are important. They obtain that these
welfare gains are important. In Spain, the welfare gains of our proposed pension
change are thus susceptible to be very significant, and a first and most important
extension of our approach will be the estimation of these gains by using a
dynamic general equilibrium model.
Some important questions arise in the practical implementation of the
pension change. The first question is when this change must start. If the
government wants to maximize the likelihood of a successful reform, the answer
is easy: as soon as possible. The Spanish economy has recently started an
expansion period that is usually decisive for a successful financing of fiscal
adjustments. As empirical evidence shows, successful fiscal adjustment (Belgium,
1987; Ireland, 1987-1989) are normally carried out in expansive periods.
Moreover, the dynamics of pension costs becomes costlier a future reform of the
pension system.
A last issue is a political one, and has to do with the political incentives to
implement a pension reform such as the proposed here. If the median voter
approach were empirically valid, the results of this paper show that a potential
government would have a very strong incentive to start the transition as soon as
possible. However, information is incomplete and costly, electoral periods only
last four years, and whereas almost the entire transition costs are beared during
the first transition years, the benefits spread over a longer period. A practical
implementation of the pension reform here defended is thus only possible through
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a process of becoming aware most of the population about the real and substantial
gains derived from the pension system change.
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8. Appendix.
Appendix I: The Dynamics of the Endogenous Growth Model.
To simplify the study of the endogenous growth model's dynamics, we first write
an analogous, continuous time version of  equations (9)-(10):
&K(t) =  
s
P (t)
 [A(t) K(t) ]  H(t )  -   K(t)
*
a b d
& &A(t)
A(t)
 =   
K(t)
K(t)
g
The solution of the last equation is given by A(t) = C K(t)g where Cº [A(t0) /
K(t0)]g. Substituting this result into the first equation and dividing by K(t), we
have
&K(t)
K(t)
 =  
s
P (t)
 B K(t )  H(t )  -  
*
(1+ )-1a g b d
For a (1+g) < 1 (our estimations imply a (1+g) = 0,544 < 1), for any initial value
K(t0), the capital-output ratio (weighted by the relative prices) converges to a
value such that the growth rate reaches its steady state value gK = (b gH + p) / (1-
a (1+g)) (p is the (negative) growth rate of PK(t) / PY(t)). This result is due to the
concavity of the equation (s / P*) B K(t)a(1+g)-1 H(t)b - d with respect to K(t).
Moreover, it is easy to show that, in the balanced growth path (where the nominal
utput and the nominal value stock of physical capital grows at a common rate, g);
the value of the ratio pK(t) K(t) /pY(t)Y(t) is equal to s / (g + d).
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Appendix II: Estimation of Pension Benefits
A. Pacto de Toledo.
The pension obtained under the Pacto de Toledo reform corresponds to the
average real wage of the last 35 years before the first pension payment starts.
However, the last two years of these 35 years are computed in nominal terms.
Assuming that the inflation rate is p = 3%, and that wages grow at a yearly rate of
g = 2%, the Pacto de Toledo corresponding pension is:
PactoToledo
0 t
T-3
0
P  =
w(T) + w(T -1) / (1 + ) + w(t ) / (1 + )[  (g (t - t )) dt]
T
=0
p p ò exp
[ ]w w w( ) ( ) / ( , ) ( ) / ( , ) exp( , )( ) / ( , )35 34 1 0 03 0 1 0 03 0 02 33 1 0 02
35
+ + + + -
Using the data about initial wages for different workers, we obtain the pension
values that appear in Tables IX-X.
B. Capitalization of Pension Funds.
In this case, the evolution of total wealth in pension funds W(t) follows the
differential equation
& ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )W t r t W t w t x= + -q 1
where r(t) is the average rate of return implicit in our results of capital and output
evolution, 2 is the wage fraction destined to pension funds (equal to 0,248 in this
exercise), and
[ ]w t w t g dsw stt( ) ( ) exp ( )= ò0 0
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is the wage at t (gw(s) = gY(s) - gN is the rate of growth of real wages, equal to the
rate of growth of output minus the rate of growth of working population), and x is
the fraction of the yearly contribution destined both to cover intermediation costs
and incapacity pensions. We consider x =  0,35.
Solving the previous differential equation, we have
W T) r s ds W t x w t g ds
t
T
w st
t
t
T
( exp( ( ) )( ( ) ( ) ( )( exp( )( )= + -ò òò
0 00
0 01 q
exp( ( ) )))- ò r s dst
t
0
This equation gives total wealth in pension funds at the end of the contribution
period. Assuming that pensions remain constant in real terms, the annuity
corresponding to that wealth is
[ ]P
W T)
r s ds dt
Capital
T
t
T
T.
(
exp ( )
*=
- òò
where T* = max (E (Life)contributor, E (Life)consort) is the maximum life expectancy of
the contributor to the pension plan and his or her consort, that is, we include
widow pensions in our calculations. Under the assumptions r(s) = r = 0,05 and T*
= 20, we obtain the pension benefits shown in Tables IX-X.
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TABLE I
Human Capital Data
Professional
Categories
Gross Wage
Earnings
1995
Structure of Ocupied Workers in terms of
Educational Achievement
1964 1984 1994
College
Degree
5.260.000 1,4 4,5 7,4
High-Skill 4.000.000 1,5 5,0 7,14
Middle-Skill 2.900.000 2,95 24,2 44,7
Low-Skill 2.000.000 78,8 53,3 32,7
Unskilled 1.370.000 9,1 10,7 7,2
Source: Active Population Survey and Wage Survey (Instituto Nacional de Estadística). Own
estimations.
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TABLE II
Actual Evolution of Savings Rates, Physical Capital and Ouput: 1996-2025
(with an output and capital accumulation estimated growth rates of 3%, in real
thousand milion ptas. 1995)
Years Savings Rate Capital Output
1996 0,21 154.673.855 68.455.056
1997 0,21 159.314.070 70.508.708
1998 0,21 164.093.492 72.623.969
1999 0,21 169.016.297 74.802.688
2000 0,21 174.086.786 77.046.769
2001 0,21 179.309.390 79.358.172
2002 0,21 184.688.671 81.738.917
2003 0,21 190.229.331 84.191.085
2004 0,21 195.936.211 86.716.817
2005 0,21 201.814.298 89.318.322
2006 0,21 207.868.727 91.997.871
2007 0,21 214.104.789 94.757.807
2008 0,21 220.527.932 97.600.542
2009 0,21 227.143.770 100.528.558
2010 0,21 233.958.083 103.544.415
2011 0,21 240.976.826 106.650.747
2012 0,21 248.206.131 109.850.270
2013 0,21 255.652.315 113.145.778
2014 0,21 263.321.884 116.540.151
2015 0,21 271.221.541 120.036.356
2016 0,21 279.358.187 123.637.446
2017 0,21 287.738.932 127.346.570
2018 0,21 296.371.100 131.166.967
2019 0,21 305.262.233 135.101.976
2020 0,21 314.420.100 139.155.035
2021 0,21 323.852.703 143.329.686
2022 0,21 333.568.285 147.629.577
2023 0,21 343.575.333 152.058.464
2024 0,21 353.882.593 156.620.218
2025 0,21 364.499.071 161.318.825
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TABLE  III
Evolution of  Savings Rates, Physical Capital and Output in a Neoclassical
Model under the Transition to a Fully Funded Pensions System: 1996-2025
(in real thousand milion ptas. 1995)
Years Savings Rate Capital Output
1996 0,2581 158.526.231 68.455.057
1997 0,2605 167.373.769 71.690.633
1998 0,2629 176.604.581 74.576.029
1999 0,2653 186.234.507 77.558.146
2000 0,2678 196.280.039 80.640.466
2001 0,2702 206.758.344 83.826.582
2002 0,2724 217.669.299 87.120.198
2003 0,2746 229.030.379 90.522.146
2004 0,2768 240.859.765 94.036.302
2005 0,2790 253.176.371 97.666.662
2006 0,2812 265.999.867 101.417.347
2007 0,2830 279.307.228 105.292.607
2008 0,2848 293.117.167 109.290.022
2009 0,2866 307.449.143 113.413.951
2010 0,2884 322.323.388 117.668.883
2011 0,2902 337.760.924 122.059.441
2012 0,2915 353.723.482 126.590.392
2013 0,2928 370.230.424 131.257.726
2014 0,2942 387.301.871 136.066.275
2015 0,2955 404.958.728 141.021.012
2016 0,2968 423.222.703 146.127.054
2017 0,2978 442.066.316 151.389.670
2018 0,2988 461.510.344 156.807.187
2019 0,2998 481.576.351 162.384.998
2020 0,3008 502.286.710 168.128.649
2021 0,3018 523.664.621 174.043.847
2022 0,3020 545.600.246 180.136.461
2023 0,3023 568.111.947 186.394.241
2024 0,3025 591.218.795 192.822.883
2025 0,3028 614.940.574 199.428.228
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TABLE IV
Ordinary Least Square Estimation of Equation 11
(based on data for 1963-1995)
Variable Beta Standard Error t - Statistic
gk 0,544 0,07046 7,724
(Constant) 0,0066 0,45543 0,014
R Square 0,673
Adj. R Square 0,662
Standard Error 1,235
F - Statistic 59,7
Confidence
Interval
(0,425 - 0,663)
Source: Own estimations.
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TABLE  V
Evolution of  Savings Rates, Physical Capital and Output in a Endogenous
Growth Model without Savings Substitution under the Transition to a Fully
Funded Pensions System: 1996-2025
(in real thousand milion ptas. 1995)
Years Savings Rate Capital Output
1996 0,2581 158.668.714 68.455.057
1997 0,2605 167.676.244 71.201.455
1998 0,2629 177.220.145 74.065.511
1999 0,2653 187.330.756 77.051.872
2000 0,2678 198.040.078 80.165.375
2001 0,2702 209.381.863 83.411.053
2002 0,2724 221.372.776 86.794.144
2003 0,2746 234.048.457 90.315.825
2004 0,2768 247.446.447 93.981.543
2005 0,2790 261.606.284 97.796.964
2006 0,2812 276.569.610 101.767.985
2007 0,2830 292.332.268 105.900.741
2008 0,2848 308.935.655 110.191.582
2009 0,2866 326.423.284 114.646.618
2010 0,2884 344.840.888 119.272.196
2011 0,2902 364.236.536 124.074.918
2012 0,2915 384.590.810 129.061.650
2013 0,2928 405.949.953 134.225.990
2014 0,2942 428.362.471 139.574.637
2015 0,2955 451.879.244 145.114.554
2016 0,2968 476.553.642 150.852.973
2017 0,2978 502.380.220 156.797.413
2018 0,2988 529.411.838 162.944.623
2019 0,2998 557.703.869 169.302.131
2020 0,3008 587.314.319 175.877.757
2021 0,3018 618.303.954 182.679.624
2022 0,3020 650.562.693 189.716.170
2023 0,3023 684.141.163 196.966.927
2024 0,3025 719.092.271 204.439.441
2025 0,3028 755.471.296 212.141.535
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TABLE VI
Evolution of  Savings Rates, Physical Capital and Output in a Endogenous
Growth Model with Savings Substitution of 20% under the Transition to a
Fully Funded Pensions System: 1996-2025
(in real thousand milion ptas. 1995)
Years Savings Rate Capital Output
1996 0,2485 158.004.935 68.455.057
1997 0,2504 166.281.784 71.036.848
1998 0,2523 175.023.024 73.724.557
1999 0,2543 184.253.591 76.522.219
2000 0,2562 193.999.731 79.434.032
2001 0,2581 204.289.069 82.464.359
2002 0,2599 215.135.740 85.617.733
2003 0,2617 226.568.948 88.895.457
2004 0,2634 238.619.398 92.302.254
2005 0,2652 251.319.368 95.843.033
2006 0,2670 264.702.794 99.522.894
2007 0,2684 278.767.841 103.347.138
2008 0,2698 293.548.505 107.313.286
2009 0,2713 309.080.457 111.426.652
2010 0,2727 325.401.131 115.692.748
2011 0,2742 342.549.807 120.117.303
2012 0,2752 360.513.594 124.706.265
2013 0,2763 379.330.744 129.455.056
2014 0,2773 399.041.323 134.369.536
2015 0,2784 419.687.298 139.455.782
2016 0,2794 441.312.627 144.720.104
2017 0,2802 463.916.234 150.169.050
2018 0,2810 487.542.082 155.800.651
2019 0,2818 512.236.162 161.621.506
2020 0,2826 538.046.592 167.638.460
2021 0,2834 565.023.710 173.858.617
2022 0,2836 593.087.894 180.289.346
2023 0,2838 622.282.571 186.915.181
2024 0,2840 652.653.063 193.742.853
2025 0,2842 684.246.669 200.779.337
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TABLE VII
Evolution of  Savings Rates, Physical Capital and Output in a Endogenous
Growth Model with Savings Substitution of 60% under the Transition to a
Fully Funded Pensions System: 1996-2025
(in real thousand milion ptas. 1995)
Years Savings Rate Capital Output
1996 0,2292 156.677.378 68.455.057
1997 0,2302 163.502.541 70.707.635
1998 0,2312 170.659.155 73.043.202
1999 0,2321 178.162.800 75.464.643
2000 0,2331 186.029.791 77.974.951
2001 0,2341 194.277.214 80.577.223
2002 0,2350 202.915.692 83.274.673
2003 0,2358 211.963.386 86.068.932
2004 0,2367 221.439.298 88.963.368
2005 0,2376 231.363.316 91.961.472
2006 0,2385 241.756.251 95.066.858
2007 0,2392 252.622.026 98.283.273
2008 0,2399 263.982.000 101.610.645
2009 0,2406 275.858.494 105.052.804
2010 0,2414 288.274.837 108.613.716
2011 0,2421 301.255.413 112.297.489
2012 0,2426 314.800.481 116.108.376
2013 0,2431 328.934.655 120.045.484
2014 0,2437 343.683.629 124.113.116
2015 0,2442 359.074.223 128.315.729
2016 0,2447 375.134.434 132.657.934
2017 0,2451 391.871.930 137.144.504
2018 0,2455 409.315.501 141.776.082
2019 0,2459 427.495.178 146.557.572
2020 0,2463 446.442.283 151.494.050
2021 0,2467 466.189.487 156.590.770
2022 0,2468 486.711.328 161.853.168
2023 0,2469 508.038.657 167.275.582
2024 0,2470 530.203.596 172.863.280
2025 0,2471 553.239.581 178.621.711
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TABLE VIII
Average Rates of Return of Physical Capital and Wage Growth Rates in a
Endogenous Growth Model with Savings Substitution of 20% and 60%
under the Transition to a Fully Funded Pensions System: 1996-2025
Substitution of 20% Substitution of 60%
Years r gw r gw
1996 0,1218 0,0200 0,1218 0,0200
1997 0,1207 0,0277 0,1214 0,0229
1998 0,1197 0,0278 0,1211 0,0230
1999 0,1186 0,0279 0,1207 0,0232
2000 0,1175 0,0281 0,1202 0,0233
2001 0,1164 0,0281 0,1198 0,0234
2002 0,1153 0,0282 0,1194 0,0235
2003 0,1143 0,0283 0,1189 0,0236
2004 0,1132 0,0283 0,1185 0,0236
2005 0,1121 0,0284 0,1180 0,0237
2006 0,1110 0,0284 0,1175 0,0238
2007 0,1100 0,0284 0,1171 0,0238
2008 0,1089 0,0284 0,1166 0,0239
2009 0,1079 0,0283 0,1161 0,0239
2010 0,1069 0,0283 0,1157 0,0239
2011 0,1059 0,0282 0,1152 0,0239
2012 0,1049 0,0282 0,1147 0,0239
2013 0,1040 0,0281 0,1143 0,0239
2014 0,1031 0,0280 0,1138 0,0239
2015 0,1022 0,0279 0,1134 0,0239
2016 0,1013 0,0277 0,1129 0,0238
2017 0,1004 0,0277 0,1125 0,0238
2018 0,0996 0,0275 0,1121 0,0238
2019 0,0988 0,0274 0,1117 0,0237
2020 0,0980 0,0272 0,1113 0,0237
2021 0,0973 0,0271 0,1109 0,0236
2022 0,0965 0,0270 0,1105 0,0236
2023 0,0959 0,0268 0,1101 0,0235
2024 0,0952 0,0265 0,1098 0,0234
2025 0,0946 0,0263 0,1095 0,0233
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TABLE IX
Pay-As-You-Go Pension Benefits vs Fully Funded Pension Benefits computed under the three Growth Models in 2025
(with a capitalization rate of 3%)
Gross Wage
Earnings
Pay-As-You-Go
Pension Benefits
Capital.Annuity 
(Neoclassical
Model)
Capital. Annuity
(Endogenous
Model without
Substitution)
Capital. Annuity
(Endogen. Model
5.260.000 6.726.092 15.373.264 19.067.964
4.000.000 5.114.899 11.690.695 14.500.353
2.900.000 3.708.302 8.475.754 10.512.756
2.000.000 2.557.450 5.845.347 7.250.176
1.370.000 1.751.853  4.004.063 4.966.371
Assumptions:
Fully Funded Pension: 30 contribution years, retirement at 70, life expectancy at 90, a 24.8% pay-roll tax rate, 10% financial intermediation cost and
3% capitalization rate of total wealth in Pension Funds.
Pay-as-you-go Pension (Pacto de Toledo reform): retirement at 70, 2% real wage growth rate, the last 35 years wage earnings computed in real terms
but the last two in nominal terms.
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TABLE X
Pay-As-You-Go Pension Benefits vs Fully Funded Pension Benefits computed under the three Growth Models in 2025
(with a capitalization rate of 5%)
Gross Wage
Earnings
Pay-As-You-Go
Pension Benefits
Capital. Annuity 
(Neoclassical
Model)
Capital. Annuity
(Endogenous
Model without
Substitution)
Capital. Annuity
(Endogen. Model
Substitution)
5.260.000 6.726.092 18.288.278 22.683.551
4.000.000 5.114.899 13.907.435 17.249.849
2.900.000 3.708.302 10.082.891 12.506.140
2.000.000 2.557.450 6.953.718 8.624.924
1.370.000 1.751.853  4.763.297 5.908.073
Assumptions:
Fully Funded Pension: 30 contribution years, retirement at 70, life expectancy at 90, a 24.8% pay-roll tax rate, 10% financial intermediation cost and
5% capitalization rate of total wealth in Pension Funds.
Pay-as-you-go Pension (Pacto de Toledo reform): retirement at 70, 2% real wage growth rate, the last 35 years wage earnings computed in real  terms
but the last two in nominal terms.
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